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Abstract 
Recent scholarship shows that the gender gap in political activity has diminished, particularly in 
western societies. Still unknown is how gender matters for political participation in Asia. Using 
the 2010 Asian Barometer Survey, this article analyzes the gender gap in multiple forms of 
political participation in 13 countries. It also investigates how individual-level characteristics 
mediate the differences in men’s and women’s political participation. The article shows that 
Asian men and women overwhelmingly vote at an equal rate in elections, but gender gaps persist 
in other types of political action. This study shows that gender remains the strongest predictor of 
political participation and suggests that Asian women remain marginalized in the political arena. 
The results have important implications for how to progress gender equality in the region. 
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Introduction 
Political participation is considered crucial for a democracy because it is a means for 
individuals to communicate preferences to those in power. While varying factors can explain 
individuals’ civic engagement, gender consistently remains a strong predictor of civic engagement 
across a variety of countries. Although literature increasingly demonstrates that gender gaps are 
closing in some forms of political action in western societies (Bode, 2017; Burns et al., 2018), 
research also shows that women, particularly in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, still 
participate less than men in formal politics (Desposato and Norrander, 2008; Coffé and Dilli, 
2015; Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2011; 2010; Espinal and Zhao, 2015). This unequal participation 
raises questions about the legitimacy and effectiveness of the representation of women. While 
mixed findings suggest that gender differences in political actions are context-specific (Kittilson 
and Schwindt-Bayer, 2012), a comprehensive understanding of these patterns in Asia is still 
lacking. It is especially crucial to examine the gender gap in Asia, as the region differs from 
previously studied cases. For example, Liu (2018) finds that Asian women legislators do not 
serve as role models but instead discourage women in the region from participating in politics. 
This is at odds with studies in western contexts suggesting that women politicians increase 
women’s political engagement. Therefore, there is reason to believe that gender gaps in political 
participation in Asia works differently from those in other contexts. Understanding how men 
and women behave differently in politics helps us understand the extent to which Asian men and 
women differ in their political access, freedom, capability, capacity, will, and desire. To address 
the gap in existing studies, this article explores two questions: (1) To what extent do Asian men 
and women participate differently in politics? (2) To what extent do standard explanations at the 
individual-level mediate the gender gap in Asia? 
Using the 2010 Asian Barometer Survey, I conduct a systematic analysis of the gender 
gap in multiple forms of political actions across 13 cases in East and Southeast Asia (hereafter 
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ESA). Understanding various forms of participation is important as scholars suggest that while 
differences in men’s and women’s political behavior exist, it may be that women participate 
differently from men instead of participating less (Harrison and Munn, 2007). I find that the 
gender gap in ESA is absent in voting but remains strong and consistent in other modes of 
political action. Also, building on existing work arguing that resources and political attitudes 
affect gender differentials in political participation (Verba et al., 1997), I find that resources and 
political attitudes help mediate gender gaps only in some forms of political actions and only in 
some contexts.  
Scholars have given insufficient attention to the gender gaps in political participation 
beyond western contexts. This article addresses the gap in current literature by offering findings 
from ESA, which are useful for two reasons. First, the findings address an area largely ignored in 
existing scholarship. Asian population is equivalent to 60% of the total world population, 
suggesting our current knowledge of political behavior is seriously lacking, since previous cross-
national comparisons of gender and politics have neglected ESA. Even when scholars study 
gendered political participation in ESA, they focus on single cases or small-N comparisons (e.g. 
Buranajaroenkij et al., 2018; Yang, 2018; Lee, 2019; Huang 2005). To my knowledge, this is the 
first systematic investigation of the gender gap in political participation across multiple countries 
in the region, making it possible and easier to compare the gender gaps across ESA. Although 
variation exists across the region, ESA countries still share many ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
similarities. ESA countries also share similar paths, patterns, and histories of democracy, making 
generalization possible. Building on prior single-case studies, not only does my systematic 
comparison enable a comprehensive understanding of Asian men and women’s political 
behavior, but it also provides empirical evidence for theory contending that electoral 
participation is unique in Asia. As ESA is home for new and unconsolidated democracies, this 
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study opens the door for future inquiries regarding the different patterns and trends of gender 
gaps in political participation in ESA and beyond.  
 The second contribution lies in the implications for gender equality in ESA – a region 
that is distinct from other parts of the world. ESA is home to over two billion women (United 
Nations World Population Prospects 2018). Some of these women have been active in politics 
for decades. For example, women were major actors of the Philippines People Power Movement 
of 1986. These political scenes show the need to examine how gender parity exists in Asian 
politics. Showing what motivates and transforms women’s political actions could help close the 
gender gap in civic engagement, which would consequently further the development of the 
region towards a representative democracy. Hence, evidence from this study can help look into 
ways to tackle gender inequality in civic engagement in ESA.  
Explaining gender gaps in political participation 
Resources are essential for the ability to participate in politics (Simonsen, 2018). Drawing 
on Verba et al. (1995) and Burns et al. (2001), my definition of resources expands beyond 
traditional socioeconomic status; instead it refers to factors that explain political participation, 
such as ability and recruitment to participate. Based on this definition of resources, which 
includes independent income, political information, civic skills, and social networks – essential to 
participation – women experience disadvantages because they traditionally have lower education 
attainment and lower employment opportunities. Furthermore, women are likely to be prevented 
from engaging in politics the same way that men do (Inglehart and Norris, 2000) because of 
gendered expectations concerning their fulfilment of familial duties. Protesting, for example, 
requires participants to invest time and energy and pay for transportation, resulting in women’s 
limited engagement in public affairs.  
Political attitudes are also a form of social capital that can mediate the gender gap in 
political participation (Morales and Giugni, 2016). Since political activities require individuals’ 
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investment of time and energy, individuals are unlikely to participate in politics if not interested. 
Similarly, if individuals do not believe that the government is fair and transparent, they are 
unlikely to partake in electoral institutions implemented by the government. If individuals do not 
believe that they can influence government, they are unlikely to make the effort to shape political 
affairs.  
Although these political attitudes determine the likelihood to participate, they can be 
cultivated. However, such socialization is gendered. As women’s place is often restricted to the 
private sphere, women are likely to be discouraged from engaging in public affairs whereas men 
are encouraged to pursue public office as society perceives them as potentially strong, decisive, 
and capable leaders. For example, parents are more likely to discuss politics with their sons than 
with their daughters (Fox and Lawless, 2014), suggesting that women’s interests are not 
cultivated in the same way as men’s. In the long term, as women tend to have a lower level of 
political interest and efficacy, resulting in their lower level of political participation (Verba et al., 
1997).  
Gender gaps in political participation in ESA 
A wealth of scholarship examines the gender gaps in political participation.1 I argue that 
significant gender differences do not exist in voting whereas they do in other modes of political 
actions in ESA.  
Voting 
Generally, women are found to participate less in politics than men (Gallego, 2009; 
Kunovich et al., 2007). However, research also demonstrates that women’s likelihood to vote has 
increasingly become equal or higher in western democracies than men’s likelihood (Currell, 
                                                 
1 Gender gap is defined as the difference between men and women in their tendencies and 
frequencies to engage in political activities. 
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2005). Like other parts of the world, ESA has been developing economically, suggesting that the 
gender gap in voting may follow the trajectory of disappearance elsewhere in post-industrial 
contexts. Additionally, ESA has unique features that may lead to gender having a different effect 
on political participation. For example, Taylor (1996) theorizes that Asian citizens take elections 
especially seriously. Despite the lack of capacity for constituents to hold representatives 
accountable, Asians still like being involved in the process. The unique electoral culture of Asia, 
including patron-client relationships and corporatist-like desires for organizational unity and 
harmony, can explain the active involvement of Asian citizens. Furthermore, Chua (2007) 
contends that elections have a different meaning in Asia. Electoral politics in Asia can be seen as 
cultural events in which people actively engage, rather than political practice. Consequently, 
voting has been normalized for both men and women. It is possible that normalizing voting as a 
cultural practice leads women to vote as much as men do.  
Also, unlike western democracies, many ESA countries democratized during the third 
wave of democratization. Asian men and women gained suffrage at the same time during these 
transitions. Because men and women were introduced to deliberation simultaneously and had the 
same opportunity to be socialized politically, there is reason to believe that men and women are 
equally likely to vote in ESA.2 
Political participation beyond voting 
On the other hand, the region also has distinctive features that could lead to gender 
differences in participation. First, ESA is the only region, besides Africa, where women’s social 
                                                 
2 Although I expect men and women to vote at the same rate, I am also aware that there might 
outliers, especially countries where gender developments lag significant behind others in various 
aspects, such as women’s political representation, economic opportunities, education, health, and 
agency, etc. 
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status lags significantly behind women’s political status (Liu, 2018). Gender equality has 
progressed in Asian politics where many national parliaments have more than 25% women, 
which is higher than the global average. Eight3 out of 15 ESA countries have also adopted 
gender quotas, making the region more advanced than its western counterparts. India, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, have also had female heads of state. Nonetheless, Asian women 
still experience gender-based discrimination and prejudice in their daily lives, especially in the 
social sphere. Gender inequality in social structures may translate into gender disparity in political 
behavior, reducing women’s desire to participate in costlier and riskier actions, especially if their 
daily experiences with gender norms remain the same. 
Moreover, recent electoral campaigns and other forms of political action have departed 
from the previously known methods. For instance, political marketing is popular and successful 
in Thailand (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2008) Malaysia also has new ways to distribute information 
via technology and communication (Suffian, 2010). As the digital divide continues to be 
gendered (Rai, 2019), the commercialization of campaigns may also mean that women have had 
fewer chances to partake in such actions. Methods of political action vary across contexts and 
women’s political participation also varies across type of activities, depending on the ease of 
access for women (Liu and Banaszak, 2017). I argue that women in ESA engage less in political 
action that is more public in nature, costlier of time and resources, and riskier than voting.  
Resources 
Employment helps diversify an individual’s economic interests and extend an individual’s 
social circle (Campbell, 2013). The gender structure in ESA countries, nonetheless, remains 
somewhat more traditional than its western counterparts (Raymo et al., 2015), preventing 
resources to have a similar impact on decreasing the gender gap in political participation. While 
                                                 
3 Laos, Singapore, Vietnam, Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, and Timor-Leste. 
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proportionately fewer Asian women are employed than men, oftentimes women’s economic 
contribution is invisible. Asian women are more likely to contribute to the informal economy or 
work in rural areas than are men. Asian women retire much earlier than men (Asian 
Development Bank, 2016). Although women’s labor participation guarantees some degree of 
financial freedom in western societies, Asian women’s economic gains do not provide increased 
autonomy, suggesting that gender structure does not change much as women’s socioeconomic 
resources increase (Al-Amin and Howdhury, 2008). If resources are limited in enhancing 
women’s macro- or micro-level status in ESA, I argue that their effect on reducing the gender 
gap in political participation is questionable. 
Political attitudes 
ESA differ from western societies; they transitioned to democracy at a later period and 
some are still undergoing transitions. Not only does this mean that Asian democracies are newer 
and less consolidated, but it also means that many Asians have lived through non-democratic 
regimes, resulting in fears about expressing their opinions and engaging in activities (Letki, 2018). 
Furthermore, ESA’s equal suffrage extension means that men and women were exposed to the 
environment for political participation at the same time, resulting in their equal likelihoods of 
socialization. Asian men and women have had a chance to observe the strengths and weaknesses 
of western democracies at the same time. Therefore, I argue that the effect of political attitudes 
on reducing the gender gap in political participation in ESA is limited. 
Data and methodology  
Employing the 2010 Asian Barometer Survey4 (ABS), I examine the gender differences in 
political actions. The ABS uses a national probability sample of citizens in 13 ESA countries: 
                                                 
4 Like other surveys, the ABS relies on self-reported behaviour. No empirical evidence, to my 
knowledge, finds that Asians are more likely to inaccurately report than individuals in other 
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Hong Kong, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the People’s Republic of China, Mongolia, the 
Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia.5 
Dependent variables 
Different forms of political participation vary in nature.  The varying levels of risks and 
costs associated with political action contribute to gender differences in political participation 
(Liu and Banaszak, 2017). I differentiate modes of political action by incorporating Dalton’s 
(2013) research on civic engagement and by using four different measures.6  
                                                 
regional surveys. Scholars have used Asian surveys to show robustness findings about public 
opinion, validating public opinion research in Asia (e.g. Pietsch 2015; Sobel et al. 2010). 
5 Due to data constraints, my sample excludes Brunei, East Timor, Laos, Myanmar, Macau, 
North Korea, and Timor-Leste. Although I cannot determine how such an exclusion would bias 
my results, my findings provide a glimpse of the gender gaps in political behavior that share 
similarities with those excluded in the sample. For example, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos 
share geographical, political, and historical similarities while Macau and Hong Kong share similar 
characteristics. 
6 Indices are created for some political actions. The variables are carefully considered and 
correlated before being placed into an index. The gender gap in each activity resembles others 
before it is added to an index. Some types of political actions are missing participants’ responses 
more than others. For robustness checks, I estimate these missing values by using the multiple 
imputation by chained equations (MICE) in Stata – a practical approach to generating values for 
missing data based on observed and available independent variables (White et al. 2011). The 
results using imputed data are similar to those without data imputation presented in this paper.  
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First, I examine voting – an action low in risk and cost that requires little cooperation 
with others. To learn about participants’ voting patterns, I code participants’ responses, 0—No 
and 1—Yes, to answer the question of whether they voted in the most recent national election.  
Second, I evaluate campaign activity, which is higher in cost, time, energy, and initiation 
than voting because it requires people to make extra effort to help a candidate/party win. I 
operationalize it by creating an index7 of participants’ responses to the following activities: (1) 
attend a campaign meeting or rally?; (2) try to persuade others to vote for a certain candidate or 
party?; and (3) do anything else to help out or work for a party or candidate running in the 
election?  
Third, departing from individualistic political activities, I evaluate the gender disparity in 
another political activity involving greater cost and coordination than voting and campaign 
activity. Collective action requires time and energy as it requires individuals to make efforts to 
organize and mobilize. Its success also depends on how others are convinced to partake; 
therefore, it can be a longer process than voting or campaigning. I create an index averaging 
respondents’ participation in the following activities: (a) “Got together with others to try to 
resolve local problems” and (2) “Got together with others to raise an issue or sign a petition.” 
The items achieve a Cronbach’s alpha at 0.86, indicating good internal consistency.  
Lastly, I assess protest activity,8 which involves the greatest risk, cost, and coordination. 
For a demonstration to gain attention, individuals need to mobilize others to take to the streets. 
Protests can be risky, however, as they can involve long-distance travel and potential arrests.  
                                                 
7 The Cronbach’s Alpha reaches 0.80, indicating high internal consistency. 
 
8 Ideally, I would like to examine political participation that also includes individuals’ 
confrontational activities, but they are not included in the ABS. The closest would be a question 
that asks respondents how frequently they have “used force or violence for a political cause.” 
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Independent and control variables 
Gender is the main variable of interest. I include a dichotomous variable indicating the 
sex of respondents (female=1).  
I also evaluate whether resources and political attitudes mediate the gender differences in 
political participation in ESA by adding them as controls. I include a variety of variables that 
capture resources: age, education, employment, income, and marital status, which are found to 
influence individuals’ political activity.9 Table A1 displays the summary statistics of each variable. 
I also test how individuals’ political attitudes explain the gender gap, which I 
operationalize by using three measures: trust in political institutions, political efficacy, and 
political interest. Evidence advocates that such political trust shapes civic engagement (Uslaner 
and Brown, 2005). To measure trust in government, I use the variables from the ABS asking 
respondents how much trust they have in certain institutions: national government, parliament, 
                                                 
However, respondents in the PRC are not asked this question, creating a systematic missingness 
and leading to a reduced number of observations in my data. To ensure sufficient statistical 
power, I omit this variable on violent behavior and focus on nonviolent protest. It is also 
important to note that far fewer individuals indicate that they have protested than other modes 
of political actions (see Table A1). However, this should not affect the analysis of the gender 
gaps since I am not comparing the size of the coefficients across models. I can evaluate how 
women and men answer differently on their willingness to participate as there are hundreds of 
observations, giving me enough statistical power for analysis.  
9 Ideally, I would include religion, religiosity, and religious practice to understand how 
individuals’ conforming to patriarchal and hierarchical standards might influence their political 
behavior. However, due to systematic missingness at both the national and individual level in the 
ABS, I cannot incorporate the religious aspect into my analysis. 
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and political parties. Next, I create an index averaging these three trust-related variables with a 
Cronbach’s Alpha at 0.92 to measure individuals’ trust in political institutions. My political 
efficacy variable is based on two Likert-scaled statements. The first measures internal efficacy: 
“Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really 
understand what is going on.” The second measures external efficacy: “People like me don't have 
any influence over what the government does.” I also use the variable from the ABS that asks 
respondents how interested they are in politics.  
Estimation strategies 
To examine how men and women behave politically across 13 ESA countries as well as 
within each country, I use two estimation strategies. First, since cross-national differences in 
gender structure and political participation may exist in ESA, I account for pre-existing 
differences across countries by using multilevel models. The limited number of countries in my 
sample prohibits me from including many level-2 indicators; however, I have included relevant 
ones for gender gap: regime type, duration of democracy, development, and women’s labor 
participation. Regime type is a dichotomous variable that codes 1 for democracy and 0 for a non-
democracy. Duration of democracy is the number of years the case has been considered 
democratic. Both measures are taken from the Democracy-Dictatorship index (Cheibub et al., 
2010). I measure a country’s development by its GDP per capita and women’s labor 
participation by the percentage of women being employed outside the home by using the World 
Bank’s data.  
Second, to more closely understand the gender gap in each case, I use a binary logistic 
model10 to predict voting behavior and ordered logistic models to analyze campaign activities, 
                                                 
10Asian countries are heterogeneous in different ways and the ABS national sample sizes vary. 
Analyzing the region as a whole with country-fixed effects could be problematic and misleading. 
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collective action, and protest. For each type of political participation, I present three models: (1) 
a bivariate model that analyzes the relationship between sex of the respondents and their political 
behavior; (2) a multivariate model controling for resource factor; and (3) a multivariate model 
controlling for political attitudes.11 
Results: overall gender gaps in political participation in ESA 
Table 1 presents the multilevel models showing men and women do not differ 
significantly in their voting patterns across ESA. This is not surprising as many studies have 
found that the gender gap in voting has disappeared throughout time, which suggests that ESA 
shares similar gender progress in voting as western, post-industrial societies. I suspect that voting 
as part of one’s civic duty is normalized for both men and women because most ESA countries 
simultaneously extended suffrage to women and men when the regimes democratized. Women 
in particular are more likely to fulfil their civic duty by turning out to vote due to their generally 
higher level of conscientiousness than men (Carreras, 2018). Gender parity would be limited in 
other forms of participation, especially those that need to be cultivated beyond suffrage 
extension.  
Conversely, also evidenced in Table 1, women participate significantly less than men in 
other political activities. Specifically, women are four percentage points less likely than men to be 
                                                 
I model my study after Coffe and Bolzendahl’s (2011) on the gender gaps in political 
participation in Sub-Saharan Africa, in which they face a similar issue:a limited number of 
countries in their sample. This approach allows me to consider regional variations and offer a 
descriptive analysis of the gender gaps in each Asian country. 
11 My models test whether gender uncovers composition effects (men and women have different 
values on the independent variables) rather than emphasis effects (men and women stress these 
independent variables differently.) 
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involved in political campaigns. Moving away from electoral participation, women are 5 
percentage points and 2 percentage points less likely than men to participate in collective action 
or partake in protests, respectively. The gender gaps are wider in political actions that are more 
individualistic and less costly, namely political campaigns, than in political actions that are more 
collective and expensive. I suspect that this can be explained by the recent democratic transitions 
some cases have undergone; when a country democratizes, its people are more likely to partake 
in activities that were previously banned, such as protest. 
The multilevel models also indicate that the individual resources and the political 
attitudes variables are correlated only with certain types of political actions. Regarding resources, 
being employed leads to higher electoral participation whereas it has no significant impact on 
collective action and protest. As employment increases by one point, the average voter and 
campaign activities increase by 0.23 and 0.01 points on average, respectively. While this result 
differs from previous findings in other contexts, ESA is the only region in the world where the 
gender gap in employment has increased over the last two decades (WESO, 2017). This widening 
gender gap could be explained by the increase of Asian women’s participation in private, 
invisible labor, as well as the occupation of Asian women in traditional gender roles in rural 
areas, which prevents them from being recruited for political participation.  
Surprisingly, in ESA, more education leads to less involvement in all political actions, 
except protest, whereas more income leads to less involvement in campaign and protest. Being 
married also has a strong positive impact on voting, campaign activity, and collective action. 
Nevertheless, as marital status increases by 1 unit, the likelihood of engaging in riskier behavior, 
like street demonstrations, reduces by 0.01 point on average. 
Turning to political attitudes, political interest is the only predictor that consistently leads 
to higher political participation across all modes of behavior. An increase in political trust leads 
to an increase in voting / increased likelihood to vote v. Conversely, an increase in political trust 
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leads to a decrease in collective action and protest. Both internal and political efficacy helps 
explain increased collective action, but not actions closely linked to electoral politics. 
As the cases vary in a myriad of ways, I also consider potential linkages between national 
characteristics and the gender gaps in political participation. As Table 2 illustrates, most 
contextual indicators are not significantly correlated with political participation. Looking at level-
2 indicators, regime type has a significant effect on voting and protest – democratic regimes also 
lead to higher participation in select modes of political action. The significance of democracy in 
my model indicates that voting and protest are perhaps the two most relevant modes of action 
that can be carried out in a democracy. In other words, because voting and street demonstrations 
require governmental permission and instrumentation, democracy plays a greater role in 
individuals’ voting and protest behaviour than other political activities. Democratic duration, 
however, has no effect on political participation. This lack of effect needs to be further explored; 
however, it could be a result of its little variation across ESA. Turning to the economic factor, a 
country’s GDP per capita, interestingly, has a negative effect on campaign and protest activities 
while women’s labor participation has a positive effect on voting behavior. 
[Table 1] 
Results: gender gaps in political participation by case  
For a closer examination of the gender gap in each case, Tables 2 to 5 display the gender 
gaps in each form of political participation in their respective ESA country.12 Column 1 in these 
tables are the baseline models indicating whether men and women behave differently. Three 
patterns emerge: (1) no significant gender gap exists in voting in all ESA countries, except 
Malaysia; (2) gender gap remains consistent across almost all other political activities across ESA 
                                                 
12 Tables A2 to A14 display the full models. 
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– women always participate less than men when significant gaps exist; and (3) some gender gaps 
disappear when controls are added while some remain strong. 
Voting 
I first examine the gender gap in individuals’ likelihood to vote. The bivariate model in 
Column 1 in Table 2 indicates that men and women vote at equal rates in all ESA countries, 
except  Malaysia. The significant difference, however, between men’s and women’s voting 
behavior in Malaysia disappears when resources and political attitudes are controlled for.  
[Table 2] 
Campaigning 
Table 3 displays the gender gap in campaign activities, where the bivariate model 
indicates that all other nations experience a gender gap in campaign activities, except Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. Women campaign less than men in these cases. Gender gaps in Cambodia, China, 
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam remain significant 
when resources and political attitudes are controlled for. Women in these nations still participate 
less in campaign activities than men when controls are added. Only in Mongolia and the 
Philippines do controlling for political attitudes demonstrate a significant gender gap in 
campaign activities. Interestingly, Taiwan stands out from other cases; when resources and 
political attitudes are added, the gender gap appears – Taiwanese women campaign significantly 
more than men.  
[Table 3] 
Collective action 
 Table 4 shows that women engage less in collective action than men in all ESA countries, 
except for Hong Kong, Mongolia, Singapore, and Taiwan. The gender gaps remain consistently 
strong in Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines when controls are added. 
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Conversely, the gender gaps in collective action are no longer significant in Japan, Mongolia, 
South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam when resources and political attitudes are accounted for.  
[Table 4] 
Protest 
As shown in Table 5, all nations experience gender gaps in protest, except the 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam. Women in these cases are less likely than 
men to protest. The gender gaps in Cambodia, China, Indonesia, and Thailand remain when 
controls are added. In contrast, the gender gaps no longer exist in Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, 
and Mongolia when I account for resources and political attitudes.  
[Table 5] 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore are three of the most economically advanced 
countries in Asia – they also lack a gender gap in voting, campaign activity, and collective action. 
Although no cause can be identified in my study, both the Philippines and South Korea have a 
rich history of protests, e.g. the People Power Revolution in the Philippines in the 1980s and the 
Bu-Ma Democratic Protests in South Korea in 1979, suggesting that both women and men are 
equally exposed to peaceful demonstrations. Conversely, Singapore and Vietnam are non-
democracies, suggesting that protests may be equally inaccessible to both men and women. 
In sum, my findings about gender gaps in voting in ESA are not far from the trajectory 
of western countries in which the difference has slowly diminished. Asian men and women, 
except Malaysians, are equally likely to have voted in the last election. Several factors could 
contribute to Malaysia being an outlier in the gender gap in electoral participation. For example, 
when the ABS was conducted, only 10% of the Malaysian parliament were women—significantly 
lower than the regional average (20%). Malaysia also fell behind in other gender development 
measures, e.g. economic opportunities, education, health, and agency, when compared to other 
countries in the region (The World Bank Gender Data Portal, 2019). My results indicate that a 
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further analysis of the relationship  between these potential explanations and the gender 
differences in Malaysia is needed.  
The gender gaps in other forms of political participation – campaign activities, collective 
action, and protest—are also apparent in the bivariate model in most ESA countries when 
nothing else is considered. When gender gaps are significant, men always participate more than 
women. Prior research in western contexts shows that the gender disparity in various modes of 
political participation has reduced or ameliorated (Burns et al., 2018). Although I am unable to 
compare the size of the effect of my findings with that of previous findings, my analysis shows 
that the overall patterns of gender gaps in Asia remain strong. My findings are similar to those in 
Latin America (Espinal and Zhao, 2015) and Africa (Coffe and Bolzendahl, 2011; Isaksson et al., 
2014) where gender remains a strong indicator of political engagement and men still participate 
more than women.  
As previously discussed, mixed findings exist on how individual-level determinants help 
mediate the gender gap. On the one hand, this outcome suggests that no one-model-fits-all to 
explain the gender gaps in ESA. On the other hand, it shows that some indicators concerning 
development or type of regime could explain the differences across cases. For example, Hong 
Kong is the only case that does not experience a gender gap after these additional individual-level 
considerations are enacted, whereas Cambodia, China, and Indonesia are the only countries 
where gender differences are consistent across all modes of political actions despite these 
individual-level controls. These three countries share a common characteristic: China is a non-
democracy, while Cambodia and Indonesia are the latest Asian countries to experience 
democratic transitions. Political instability in Cambodia and Indonesia, the authoritarian regime 
of China, and the lack of gender development in these three cases might also explain why gender 
gaps are consistently strong predictors of political participation. The findings imply that gender 
parity in political participation might improve if countries like Cambodia, China, and Indonesia 
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follow the steps of other cases like Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s relatively higher gender and 
economic development could possibly mediate the gender gap. For example, the gender ratio of 
the employed population in Hong Kong is equal (Census and Statistics Department, 2017). 
Nevertheless, further investigation is needed to confirm this theory. 
Conclusion 
As ESA countries have been transitioning into more stable democracies in the last few 
decades, it is critical to evaluate women’s role and activity in politics in order to achieve a truly 
representative democracy. ESA has different features from western countries. My systematic 
comparison of the gender gap in political participation contributes to a previously underexplored 
area in global politics.  
The central finding of this paper is that gender does not influence voter participation in 
ESA. However, Asian women engage significantly less than men in other types of political 
activity as a whole. My results show that the gender gaps in some forms of political participation 
in certain contexts ameliorate while others persist even after individual-level determinants are 
accounted for. This finding raises implications for how women’s paths to politics may differ 
even when they vote at equal rates as men (Harell, 2009). My findings also illustrate that when 
comparing each type of political participation, resources and political attitudes do not mediate 
the gender gap. Nevertheless, when the role of these effects is observed across actions and 
across ESA, very few countries’ gender gaps are impervious to mediation. This finding reflects 
the persistent paternalistic bias in these countries – politics are traditionally a men’s game and 
women are not fully incorporated into the political arena in ESA. My results also challenge the 
traditional practice of including Asian cases in large-N cross-sectional data analyses; they suggest 
that ESA should no longer be ignored when conducting systematic analyses of gender and 
politics. 
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This article is limited in its explanation of the exact causes of the distinctive findings in 
ESA. For example, this study is unable to explain why some of the outliers exist in ESA and 
cannot account for its cultural differences. Nevertheless, it opens the door for future research 
Further studies examining cultural factors, such as how patrilineality and parochiality are 
practiced across ESA, might be used to explain the mixed findings between the political 
participation of men and women in the region. 
The study also raises implications regarding measurement of Asian women’s political 
participation. As the first quantitative analysis of the gender gaps in political participation in 
ESA, this research provides empirical evidence and increases comparison feasibility across ESA. 
As Fortin-Rittberger (2016) shows that the cross-national differences explain the gender gap in 
political knowledge, my analysis suggests that paying attention to how the instrumentalization 
and operationalization of survey measures in ESA match Asians’ understanding of concepts of 
political participation would be the next step towards comprehending the direct influence of 
cross-national gender gaps.  
Also, this research uses traditional measures of political action. However, examining 
women’s informal and private political actions could be more robust because of their family 
responsibilities (Stolle et al. 2005). Consequently, non-traditional or non-western forms of 
political actions must be examined in the future to ensure that scholars assess Asian women’s 
political participation appropriately and comprehensively.  
Knowing how the gender gap exists in Asians’ political participation paves the way for us 
to think about concrete ways to challenge such gender inequality. For example, a knowledge of 
what mediates the gender gaps in political participation means we can further our fight against 
intimidation, harassment, and violence against women in politics. The study also encourages the 
government to promote women’s participation in electoral processes and institutions through 
awareness campaigns and women’s candidate training that pay attention to gender differences in 
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political behavior. Knowing how gender gaps exist in ESA would also facilitate the process of 
proactively including women in the decision-making process, particularly in shaping policies that 
are discriminatory towards women. 
As Alexander et al. (2016) write that “the enhancement of assets, capabilities, and 
achievements of women to gain equality to men” (433) is women’s global political 
empowerment. Acknowledging that the gender gap exists in political participation is only the 
first step toward understanding the gendered political experiences of women in ESA, yet this 
study serves as a starting point to understand how Asian women might be empowered. It enables 
further exploration of the transformation process from limited agency in activities that are risky 
and confrontational to agency in electoral politics. Also, closing the gender gap in political 
participation has the capacity to diminish the marginalization of women in other areas, such as 
women’s political representation (Alexander et al., 2017). This study enhances the understanding 
of the gender gap in ESA, promoting the potential to engender women’s political participation as 
part of ongoing improvement of gender equality. It also enables the possibility that political 
power might be distributed more equally between the sexes.  
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Table 1 The Gender Gap in Political Participation in ESA 
 
 Vote Campaign Collective 
Action 
Protest 
Individual-level     
Female 0.06 
(0.046) 
-0.04*** 
(0.005) 
-0.05*** 
(0.008) 
-0.02*** 
(0.005) 
Age 0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00** 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00*** 
(0.000) 
Education -0.27*** 
(0.031) 
-0.01*** 
(0.003) 
0.03*** 
(0.005) 
0.01 
(0.004) 
Employed (=1) 0.23*** 
(0.049) 
0.01** 
(0.005) 
0.01 
(0.008) 
-0.01 
(0.005) 
Income 0.00 
(0.010) 
-0.00** 
(0.001) 
-0.00 
(0.002) 
-0.00** 
(0.001) 
Married (=1) 0.88*** 
(0.050) 
0.04*** 
(0.006) 
0.06*** 
(0.009) 
-0.01** 
(0.006) 
Political trust 0.18*** 
(0.036) 
0.01 
(0.004) 
-0.02** 
(0.006) 
-0.01** 
(0.004) 
Internal political efficacy 0.03 
(0.031) 
0.00 
(0.003) 
0.01** 
(0.005) 
0.00 
(0.003) 
External political efficacy -0.02 
(0.028) 
-0.00 
(0.003) 
0.02*** 
(0.005) 
0.01* 
(0.003) 
Political interest 0.29*** 
(0.027) 
0.08*** 
(0.003) 
0.08*** 
(0.005) 
0.03*** 
(0.003) 
Country-level     
Democracy (=1) 1.14*** 
(0.359) 
0.02 
(0.048) 
0.03 
(0.101) 
0.03** 
(0.014) 
Democratic duration 0.01 
(0.007) 
-0.00 
(0.001) 
0.00 
(0.002) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
GDP per capita -0.00 
(0.008) 
-0.00*** 
(0.001) 
-0.00 
(0.002) 
-0.00* 
(0.000) 
Women’s labor 
participation 
0.037* 
(0.014) 
0.00 
(0.002) 
0.00 
(0.004) 
-0.00 
(0.001) 
Constant -2.33 
(0.928) 
0.04 
(0.124) 
-0.22 
(0.258) 
0.03 
(0.042) 
No. of observations 16,785 15,860 1,7291 17,262 
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Table 2 The Gender Gap in Voting Turnout in 13 ESA Countries 
 
Country Bivariate Resources Political Attitudes 
Cambodia 0.02 
(0.141) 
0.14 
(0.160) 
0.15 
(0.162) 
China (PRC) -0.02 
(0.092) 
0.04 
(0.095) 
0.13 
(0.104) 
Hong Kong -0.27 
(0.1229) 
-0.32* 
(0.181) 
-0.24 
(0.195) 
Indonesia -0.15 
(0.187) 
-0.01  
(0.214) 
-0.13 
(0.228) 
Japan -0.20 
(0.136) 
-0.20 
(0.144) 
0.03 
(0.154) 
Malaysia -0.28* 
(0.152) 
-0.43** 
(0.167) 
-0.21 
(0.177) 
Mongolia 0.13 
(0.185) 
0.22 
(0.191) 
0.24 
(0.198) 
The Philippines 0.06 
(0.155) 
0.16 
(0.166) 
0.14 
(0.168) 
Singapore 0.06 
(0.142) 
0.19 
(0.152) 
0.17 
(0.157) 
South Korea 0.13 
(0.158) 
-0.08 
(0.173) 
0.03 
(0.181) 
Taiwan 0.13 
(0.153) 
0.07 
(0.159) 
0.19 
(0.171) 
Thailand -0.30 
(0.208) 
-0.13 
(0.221) 
0.12 
(0.237) 
Vietnam -0.22 
(0.196) 
-0.09 
(0.215) 
0.10 
(0.291) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
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Table 3 The Gender Gap in Campaign Activities in 13 ESA Countries 
 
Country Bivariate Resources Political Attitudes 
Cambodia -0.39*** 
(0.111) 
-0.28** 
(0.116) 
-0.28** 
(0.120) 
China (PRC) -0.23*** 
(0.077) 
-0.24*** 
(0.079) 
-0.17* 
(0.086) 
Hong Kong -0.43 
(0.283) 
-0.36 
(0.294) 
-0.15 
(0.328) 
Indonesia -0.73*** 
(0.107) 
-0.65*** 
(0.117) 
-0.64*** 
(0.130) 
Japan -0.50*** 
(0.13) 
-0.58*** 
(0.118) 
-0.40*** 
(0.126) 
Malaysia -0.86*** 
(0.117) 
-0.85*** 
(0.127) 
-0.62*** 
(0.135) 
Mongolia -0.28** 
(0.105) 
-0.25** 
(0.107) 
-0.12 
(0.111) 
The Philippines -0.29** 
(0.125) 
-0.20 
(0.131) 
-0.19 
(0.134) 
Singapore -0.49** 
(0.204) 
-0.42* 
(0.211) 
-0.38* 
(0.223) 
South Korea -0.61*** 
(0.147) 
-0.68*** 
(0.161) 
-0.49** 
(0.167) 
Taiwan 0.04 
(0.119) 
-0.05 
(0.122) 
0.30** 
(0.132) 
Thailand -0.39*** 
(0.097) 
-0.42*** 
(0.100) 
-0.25** 
(0.019) 
Vietnam -0.26** 
(0.111) 
-0.15 
(0.119) 
0.31* 
(0.160) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
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Table 4 The Gender Gap in Collective Action in 13 ESA Countries 
 
Country Bivariate Resources Political Attitudes 
Cambodia -0.69*** 
(0.136) 
-0.64*** 
(0.141) 
-0.62*** 
(0.144) 
China (PRC) -0.55*** 
(0.097) 
-0.59*** 
(0.101) 
-0.44*** 
(0.106) 
Hong Kong -0.24 
(0.202) 
-0.04 
(0.210) 
0.13 
(0.222) 
Indonesia -0.75*** 
(0.098) 
-0.67*** 
(0.107) 
-0.69*** 
(0.118) 
Japan -0.25*** 
(0.087) 
-0.20** 
(0.090) 
-0.08 
(0.094) 
Malaysia -0.72*** 
(0.111) 
-0.72*** 
(0.121) 
-0.54*** 
(0.125) 
Mongolia -0.23* 
(0.129) 
-0.23* 
(0.132) 
-0.14 
(0.136) 
The Philippines -0.48*** 
(0.128) 
-0.50*** 
(0.136) 
-0.52*** 
(0.137) 
Singapore -0.34 
(0.218) 
-0.35 
(0.227) 
-0.23 
(0.233) 
South Korea -0.37** 
(0.143) 
-0.32** 
(0.154) 
-0.24 
(0.161) 
Taiwan -0.34** 
(0.123) 
-0.27** 
(0.126) 
-0.07 
(0.133) 
Thailand -0.33*** 
(0.098) 
-0.30*** 
(0.101) 
-0.15 
(0.111) 
Vietnam -0.50*** 
(0.116) 
-0.48*** 
(0.125) 
-0.20 
(0.170) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
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Table 5 The Gender Gap in Protest in 13 ESA Countries 
 
Country Bivariate Resources Political Attitudes 
Cambodia 0.76* 
(0.389) 
0.84** 
(0.403) 
0.85** 
(0.403) 
China (PRC) -0.41* 
(0.203) 
-0.49** 
(0.213) 
-0.44* 
(0.225) 
Hong Kong -0.55* 
(0.291) 
-0.37 
(0.305) 
-0.08 
(0.341) 
Indonesia -0.75*** 
(0.226) 
-0.89*** 
(0.250) 
-0.96*** 
(0.272) 
Japan -0.75** 
(0.323) 
-0.71** 
(0.337) 
-0.50 
(0.354) 
Malaysia -0.58** 
(0.025) 
-0.63** 
(0.268) 
-0.45 
(0.274) 
Mongolia -0.39* 
(0.236) 
-0. 39 
(0.240) 
-0.31 
(0.246) 
The Philippines -0.12 
(0.214) 
-0.16 
(0.228) 
-0.11 
(0.230) 
Singapore -0.60 
(0.561) 
-0.75 
(0.576) 
-0.56 
(0.627) 
South Korea -0.16 
(0.256) 
-0.04 
(0.279) 
-0.15 
(0.299) 
Taiwan -0.51** 
(0.224) 
-0.54** 
(0.230) 
-0.37 
(0.238) 
Thailand -0.56** 
(0.222) 
-0.58** 
(0.231) 
-0.43* 
(0.250) 
Vietnam -0.38 
(0.400) 
-0.33 
(0.425) 
-0.19 
(0.468) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*p<0.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 Summary statistics of independent and dependent variables 
 
 No. of 
Observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Education 19,352 2.894 0.803 1 5 
Income 19,424 3.537 2.472 1 9 
Employment 19,290 0.642 0.479 0 1 
Marital status 19,309 0.721 0.449 0 1 
Age 19,420 32.074 12.882 18 88 
Political trust 18,576 2.661 0.858 1 4 
Internal political 
efficacy 
18,379 2.166 0.794 1 4 
Exrernal political 
efficacy 
18,435 2.260 0.850 1 4 
Political interest 19,239 2.481 0.905 1 4 
Vote 17,060 0.825 0.380 0 1 
Campaign activities 17,678 0.226 0.324 0 1 
Collective action 19,266 0.307 0.509 0 2 
Protest 19,217 0.067 0.326 0 2 
Democracy 19,436 0.444 0.497 0 1 
Democracy duration 19,436 16.016 20.432 0 64 
GDP per capita 19,436 38.990 853.767 0.744 47998.27 
Women’s labor 
participation 
19,436 50.842 11.731 35.75 79.30 
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Table A2 Full model of individual-level determinants of political participation in 
Cambodia 
 
 Vote Campaign Collective action Protest 
Female 0.16 
(0.162) 
-0.28** 
(0.119) 
-0.62*** 
(0.144) 
0.85** 
(0.403) 
Age 0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00*** 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
Education -0.43*** 
(0.188) 
-0.11 
(0.088) 
0.10 
(0.103) 
0.19 
(0.159) 
Employed (=1) 0.74*** 
(0.186) 
0.53*** 
(0.167) 
-0.04 
(0.190) 
0.50 
(0.519) 
Income -0.00 
(0.065) 
0.02 
(0.049) 
0.06 
(0.057) 
0.18 
(0.159) 
Married (=1) 1.43*** 
(0.165) 
0.57*** 
(0.153) 
0.15 
(0.175) 
-0.31 
(0.414) 
Political trust 0.13 
(0.111) 
0.25*** 
(0.086) 
-0.12 
(0.096) 
-0.04 
(0.277) 
Internal political 
efficacy 
-0.01 
(0.097) 
-0.06 
(0.072) 
-0.03 
(0.084) 
-0.27 
(0.245) 
External political 
efficacy 
-0.10 
(0.081) 
-0.07 
*0.063) 
-0.05 
(0.072) 
0.33* 
(0.186) 
Political interest 0.11 
(0.089) 
0.45*** 
(0.068) 
0.24*** 
(0.078) 
-0.07 
(0.209) 
Constant -0.102 
(0.646) 
2.97 
(0.505) 
1.55 
(0.578) 
5.16 
(1.606) 
No. of observations 1,158 1,161 1,162 1,162 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<0.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
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Table A3 Full model of individual-level determinants of political participation in China 
 
 Vote Campaign Collective action Protest 
Female 0.13 
(0.104) 
-0.17* 
(0.086) 
-0.44*** 
(0.012) 
-0.44* 
(0.225) 
Age -0.00** 
(0.000) 
0.00*** 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
Education -0.27*** 
(0.085) 
0.18** 
(0.071) 
0.11 
(0.122) 
0.25 
(0.170) 
Employed (=1) 0.25** 
(0.123) 
0.05 
(0.106) 
-0.09 
(0.122) 
-0.36 
(0.237) 
Income -0.00 
(0.017) 
-0.02* 
(0.014) 
-0.02 
(0.017) 
-0.05 
(0.036) 
Married (=1) 0.37** 
(0.133) 
0.05 
(0.116) 
-0.34** 
(0.126) 
-0.41 
(0.253) 
Political trust 0.40*** 
(0.090) 
0.12 
(0.080) 
-0.23** 
(0.088) 
-0.15 
(0.183) 
Internal political 
efficacy 
-0.10 
(0.095) 
0.13* 
(0.078) 
0.09 
(0.092) 
-0.18 
(0.196) 
External political 
efficacy 
-0.11 
(0.085) 
0.17** 
(0.071) 
0.14* 
(0.084) 
-0.381** 
(0.181) 
Political interest 0.14** 
(0.064) 
0.19*** 
(0.052) 
0.39*** 
(0.066) 
0.26* 
(0.135) 
Constant 0.10 
(0.518) 
2.23 
(0.449) 
1.98 
(0.5512) 
1.81 
(1.070) 
No. of observations 2,141 2,212 2,949 2,936 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<0.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
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Table A4 Full model of individual-level determinants of political participation in Hong 
Kong 
 
 Vote Campaign Collective action Protest 
Female -0.24 
(0.195) 
-0.15 
(0.328) 
0.13 
(0.222) 
-0.08 
(0.341) 
Age -0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00** 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
Education -0.41*** 
(0.130) 
0.11 
(0.199) 
0.27 
(0.151) 
0.12 
(0.222) 
Employed (=1) 0.01 
(0.204) 
-0.50 
(0.332) 
0.04 
(0.227) 
-0.17 
(0.342) 
Income 0.02 
(0.047) 
0.05** 
(0.070) 
-0.01 
(0.054) 
0.01 
(0.075) 
Married (=1) 0.30 
(0.347) 
-0.37 
(0.783) 
-1.89 
(1.023) 
-0.56 
(1.059) 
Political trust 0.02 
(0.146) 
-0.23 
(0.223) 
-0.59*** 
(0.163) 
-0.88*** 
(0.241) 
Internal political 
efficacy 
0.11 
(0.148) 
0.06 
(0.227) 
-0.10 
(0.165) 
0.53** 
(0.229) 
External political 
efficacy 
0.10 
(0.138) 
0.05 
(0.217) 
0.24 
(0.149) 
0.28 
(0.219) 
Political interest 0.36*** 
(0.123) 
1.05*** 
(0.196) 
0.69*** 
(0.135) 
1.17*** 
(0.218) 
Constant 1.41** 
(0.683) 
4.03 
(1.095) 
3.33 
(0.772) 
5.62 
(1.206) 
No. of observations 638 632 1,053 1,051 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<0.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
 
  
35 
 
 
 
Table A5 Full Model of Individual-level determinants of political participation in 
Indonesia 
 
 Vote Campaign Collective action Protest 
Female -0.13 
(0.228) 
-0.64*** 
(0.130) 
-0.69*** 
(0.118) 
-0.96*** 
(0.272) 
Age 0.00** 
(0.000) 
0.00** 
(0.000) 
-0.00** 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
Education -0.41** 
(0.166) 
0.03 
(0.092) 
0.30*** 
(0.082) 
0.31* 
(0.182) 
Employed (=1) 0.70*** 
(0.227) 
0.06 
(0.140) 
-0.02 
(0.125) 
-0.74** 
(0.266) 
Income 0.02 
(0.073) 
-0.06 
(0.046) 
0.08** 
(0.038) 
0.02 
(0.083) 
Married (=1) 1.72*** 
(0.222) 
0.06 
(0.161) 
0.42** 
(0.151) 
-0.37 
(0.279) 
Political trust 0.17 
(0.160) 
-0.06 
(0.088) 
-0.04 
(0.038) 
-0.13 
(0.173) 
Internal political 
efficacy 
0.15 
(0.191) 
0.119 
(0.104) 
-0.03 
(0.096) 
-0.23 
(0.206) 
External political 
efficacy 
0.27 
(0.166) 
0.06 
(0.094) 
0.06 
(0.088) 
0.40** 
(0.185) 
Political interest -0.01 
(0.126) 
0.51*** 
(0.070) 
0.20*** 
(0.062) 
0.38** 
(0.137) 
Constant 0.25 
(0.915) 
1.98 
(0.517) 
1.18 
(0.471) 
3.96 
(1.004) 
No. of observations 1,252 1,269 1,275 1,272 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<0.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
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Table A6 Full model of individual-level determinants of political participation in Japan 
 
 Vote Campaign Collective action Protest 
Female 0.03 
(0.154) 
-0.040*** 
(0.126) 
-0.08 
(0.094) 
-0.50 
(0.354) 
Age 0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
Education -0.10 
(0.116) 
-0.55*** 
(0.094) 
0.15** 
(0.070) 
0.30 
(0.251) 
Employed (=1) -0.45** 
(0.165) 
-0.18 
(0.125) 
-0.06 
(0.095) 
0.11 
(0.345) 
Income -0.00 
(0.031) 
-0.00 
(0.026) 
-0.04* 
(0.020) 
-0.01 
(0.077) 
Married (=1) 1.04*** 
(0.152) 
0.36** 
(0.146) 
0.55*** 
(0.082) 
0.91* 
(0.486) 
Political trust 0.30** 
(0.143) 
0.22** 
(0.104) 
-0.06 
(0.083) 
-0.75** 
(0.298) 
Internal political 
efficacy 
-0.021 
(0.100) 
-0.06 
(0.078) 
0.04 
(0.059) 
-0.07 
(0.206) 
External political 
efficacy 
0.11 
(0.091) 
0.21** 
(0.070) 
0.76 
(0.053) 
-0.00 
(0.179) 
Political interest 1.07*** 
(0.108) 
0.66*** 
(0.091) 
0.41*** 
(0.066) 
0.90*** 
(0.260) 
Constant -2.20** 
(0.636) 
2.43 
(0.518) 
2.07 
(0.397) 
6.34 
(1.533) 
No. of observations 1,771 1,801 1,801 1,801 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<0.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
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Table A7 Full model of individual-level determinants of political participation in 
Malaysia 
 
 Vote Campaign Collective action Protest 
Female -0.20 
(0.179) 
-0.62*** 
(0.135) 
-0.54*** 
(0.125) 
-0.45* 
(0.274) 
Age -0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00** 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
Education -0.17*** 
(0.040) 
-0.19** 
(0.091) 
0.01 
(0.086) 
-0.15 
(0.104) 
Employed (=1) -0.06 
(0.185) 
0.40** 
(0.136) 
0.17 
(0.125) 
0.08 
(0.267) 
Income 0.01 
(0.061) 
-0.05 
(0.046) 
-0.03 
(0.043) 
-0.15 
(0.104) 
Married (=1) 0.42** 
(0.193) 
0.45*** 
(0.141) 
0.37** 
(0.131) 
-0.04 
(0.273) 
Political trust 0.05 
(0.123) 
-0.02 
(0.089) 
0.07 
(0.084) 
-0.34* 
(0.170) 
Internal political 
efficacy 
0.17 
(0.120) 
0.08 
(0.076) 
0.02 
(0.070) 
-0.13 
(0.152) 
External political 
efficacy 
 0.05 
(0.069) 
0.08 
(0.065) 
0.00 
(0.138) 
Political interest 0.48*** 
(0.097) 
0.88*** 
(0.077) 
0.46*** 
(0.067) 
0.51*** 
(0.148) 
Constant 0.27 
(0.754) 
2.44 
(0.488) 
1.44 
(0.455) 
1.43 
(0.967) 
No. of observations 963 1,138 1,162 1,160 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<0.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
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Table A8 Full model of individual-level determinants of political participation in 
Mongolia 
 
 Vote Campaign Collective action Protest 
Female 0.26 
(0.200) 
-0.12 
(0.111) 
-0.14 
(0.136) 
-0.31 
(0.021) 
Age 0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00* 
(0.000) 
Education 0.02 
(0.041) 
-0.04 
(0.073) 
0.21** 
(0.091) 
0.15 
(0.166) 
Employed (=1) 0.09 
(0.211) 
-0.20 
(0.117) 
0.27* 
(0.145) 
0.49* 
(0.2653) 
Income -0.11* 
(0.060) 
0.60*** 
(0.137) 
-0.038 
(0.050) 
-0.13 
(0.101) 
Married (=1) 0.94*** 
(0.208) 
1.83*** 
(0.251) 
0.30 
(0.171) 
-0.05 
(0.297) 
Political trust 0.38*** 
(0.159) 
1.25** 
(0.106) 
-0.03 
(0.107) 
-0.15 
(0.193) 
Internal political 
efficacy 
-0.19 
(0.126) 
1.04 
(0.068) 
0.12** 
(0.079) 
0.15* 
(0.143) 
External political 
efficacy 
 0.98 
(0.053) 
0.07 
(0.067) 
0.30** 
(0.120) 
Political interest 0.31*** 
(0.140) 
1.88*** 
(0.146) 
0.33*** 
(0.094) 
0.24 
(0.171) 
Constant -0.51 
(0.684) 
1.58 
(0.390) 
3.26 
(0.491) 
3.81 
(0.873) 
No. of observations 1,149 1,172 1,180 1,180 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<0.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
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Table A9 Individual-level determinants of political participation in the Philippines 
 
 Vote Campaign Collective action Protest 
Female 0.14 
(0168) 
-0.19 
(0.134) 
-0.52*** 
(0.137) 
-0.11 
(0.230) 
Age -0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00*** 
(0.000) 
Education 0.15 
(0.112) 
0.21** 
(0.92) 
0.21 
(0.051) 
0.21 
(0.160) 
Employed (=1) 0.46** 
(0.168) 
0.33** 
(0.135) 
-0.11 
(0.137) 
-0.19 
(0.231) 
Income -0.21*** 
(0.054) 
-0.03 
(0.054) 
0.03 
(0.051) 
-0.13 
(0.106) 
Married (=1) 0.49** 
(0.189) 
-0.00 
(0.167) 
-0.05 
(0.150) 
-0.29 
(0.244) 
Political trust -0.02 
(0.107) 
-0.22** 
(0.087) 
-0.01 
(0.088) 
-0.05 
(0.149) 
Internal political 
efficacy 
0.08 
(0.086) 
0.01 
(0.068) 
-0.00 
(0.069) 
0.15 
(0.117) 
External political 
efficacy 
0.03 
(0.087) 
-0.09 
(0.070) 
0.02 
(0.070) 
-0.00 
(0.118) 
Political interest -0.09 
(0.094) 
0.50*** 
(0.082) 
0.27*** 
(0.080) 
0.37** 
(0.143) 
Constant 0.23 
(0.595) 
1.791 
(0.500) 
1.87 
(0.516) 
3.17 
(0.882) 
No. of observations 1,009 1,008 1,177 1,175 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<0.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
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Table A10 Full model of individual-level determinants of political participation in 
Singapore 
 
 Vote Campaign Collective action Protest 
Female 0.17 
(0.157) 
-0.38* 
(0.223) 
-0. 23 
(0.233) 
-0.56 
(0.627) 
Age 0.00* 
(0.001) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.002) 
Education -0.20** 
(0.089) 
-0.02 
(0.130) 
0.13 
(0.140) 
-0.99** 
(0.370) 
Employed (=1) 0.53*** 
(0.168) 
0.13 
(0.241) 
-0.06 
(0.244) 
0.26 
(0.655) 
Income 0.08*** 
(0.027) 
0.07 
(0.035) 
0.02 
(0.038) 
-0.04 
(0.100) 
Married (=1) 0.76*** 
(0.175) 
-0.09 
(0.240) 
-0.83*** 
(0.242) 
-0.71 
(0.696) 
Political trust 0.07 
(0.141) 
0.09 
(0.192) 
-0.21 
(0.199) 
0.83 
(0.544) 
Internal political 
efficacy 
-0.07 
(0.104) 
-0.17 
(0.145) 
-0.14 
(0.156) 
-0.77* 
(0.456) 
External political 
efficacy 
-0.01 
(0.115) 
-0.35** 
(0.165) 
0.32 
(0.167) 
-0.38 
(0.482) 
Political interest -0.02 
(0.092) 
0.86*** 
(0.137) 
0.27** 
(0.138) 
0.76* 
(0.351) 
Constant -0.83 
(0.699) 
3.65 
(0.919) 
2.59 
(0.969) 
2.80 
(2.459) 
No. of observations 778 923 944 943 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<0.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
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Table A11 Full model of individual-level determinants of political participation in South 
Korea 
 
 Vote Campaign Collective action Protest 
Female -0.03 
(0.181) 
-0.49*** 
(0.167) 
-0.24 
(0.161) 
0.15 
(0.300) 
Age 0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00*** 
(0.000) 
0.00** 
(0.000) 
Education -0.54*** 
(0.129) 
-0.19* 
(0.111) 
0.35*** 
(0.116) 
0.49** 
(0.218) 
Employed (=1) 0.06 
(0.190) 
0.16 
(0.181) 
-0.01 
(0.168) 
-0.21 
(0.298) 
Income 0.03 
(0.045) 
0.03 
(0.038) 
-0.06 
(0.040) 
-0.09 
(0.077) 
Married (=1) 0.94*** 
(0.180) 
0.80*** 
(0.211) 
0.76*** 
(0.190) 
0.13 
(0.315) 
Political trust 0.18 
(0.133) 
0.18 
(0.115) 
-0.07 
(0.117) 
0.17 
(0.212) 
Internal political 
efficacy 
-0.14 
(0.110) 
-0.06 
(0.105) 
0.18* 
(0.099) 
0.30 
(0.181) 
External political 
efficacy 
0.06 
(0.107) 
0.06 
(0.097) 
0.24** 
(0.094) 
0.32 
(0.174)* 
Political interest 0.62*** 
(0.187) 
0.48*** 
(0.093) 
0.12 
(0.089) 
0.31 
(0.167) 
Constant -0.59 
(0.699) 
3.35 
(0.066) 
5.20 
(0.674) 
8.19 
(1.285) 
No. of observations 1,087 1,094 1,161 1,157 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<0.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
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Table A12 Full model of individual-level determinants of political participation in 
Taiwan 
 
 Vote Campaign Collective action Protest 
Female 0.19 
(0.171) 
0.30* 
(0.132) 
-0.07 
(0.133) 
-0.37 
(0.0238) 
Age -0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.001) 
Education -0.16 
(0.110) 
-0.18** 
(0.087) 
0.18** 
(0.086) 
-0.13 
(0.150) 
Employed (=1) -0.26 
(0.188) 
0.20 
(0.140) 
0.08 
(0.139) 
-0.11 
(0.241) 
Income 0.09* 
(0.048) 
0.00 
(0.033) 
0.00 
(0.033) 
0.01 
(0.055) 
Married (=1) 1.05*** 
(0.173) 
0.50*** 
(0.150) 
0.30** 
(0.145) 
0.31 
(0.264) 
Political trust 0.45*** 
(0.154) 
-0.05 
(0.112) 
-0.23* 
(0.114) 
-0.27 
(0.195) 
Internal political 
efficacy 
-0.01 
(0.142) 
0.10 
(0.106) 
0.11 
(0.106) 
0.07 
(0.186) 
External political 
efficacy 
-0.01 
(0.134) 
0.02 
(0.101) 
0.14 
(0.101) 
-0.27* 
(0.180) 
Political interest 0.35*** 
(0.107) 
0.78*** 
(0.083) 
0.49*** 
(0.081) 
0.34** 
(0.138) 
Constant 0.22 
(0.623) 
2.76 
(0.529) 
2.99 
(0.528) 
1.50 
(0.907) 
No. of observations 1,408 1,472 1,475 1,474 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<0.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
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Table A13 Full model of individual-level determinants of political participation in 
Thailand 
 
 Vote Campaign Collective action Protest 
Female 0.12 
(0.237) 
-0.25** 
(0.009) 
-0.14 
(0.111) 
-0.43* 
(0.250) 
Age 0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00** 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
0.00 
(0.000) 
Education -0.27* 
(0.145) 
-0.14 
(0.080) 
-0.1 
(0.080) 
0.06 
(0.170) 
Employed (=1) 0.78*** 
(0.243) 
0.11 
(0.135) 
0.35 
(0.137) 
-0.36 
(0.279) 
Income -0.01 
(0.056) 
-0.13*** 
(0.034) 
-0.06 
(0.032) 
-0.03 
(0.071) 
Married (=1) 1.25*** 
(0.236) 
0.39** 
(0.133) 
0.53*** 
(0.132) 
-0.11 
(0.283) 
Political trust 0.06 
(0.154) 
-0.08 
(0.133) 
-0.22*** 
(0.072) 
0.19 
(0.156) 
Internal political 
efficacy 
-0.24 
(0.171) 
0.22*** 
(0.075) 
0.02 
(0.077) 
0.26* 
(0.150) 
External political 
efficacy 
-0.17 
(0.113) 
-0.13** 
(0.056) 
0.15** 
(0.057) 
0.12 
(0.122) 
Political interest 0.58*** 
(0.152) 
0.63*** 
(0.075) 
0.62*** 
(0.075) 
0.77*** 
(0.185) 
Constant -0.13 
(0.855) 
1.144 
(0.424) 
1.37 
(0.435) 
5.78 
(0.997) 
No. of observations 1,289 1,306 1,309 1,307 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<0.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
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Table A14 Full model of individual-level determinants of political participation in 
Vietnam 
 Vote Campaign Collective action Protest 
Female 0.11 
(0.291) 
0.31* 
(0.160) 
-0.20 
(0.170) 
1.89 
(0.029) 
Age -0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00*** 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.000) 
-0.00 
(0.001) 
Education 0.41 
(0.246) 
-0.32** 
(0.140) 
-0.27 
(0.148) 
-0.46 
(0.453) 
Employed (=1) -0.37 
(0.330) 
0.40** 
(0.172) 
0.29 
(0.185) 
0.77 
(0.580) 
Income -0.15* 
(0.080) 
-0.11** 
(0.044) 
-0.10** 
(0.045) 
0.02 
(0.160) 
Married (=1) 0.77** 
(0.328) 
0.30 
(0.220) 
0.36 
(0.240) 
1.28 
(1.043) 
Political trust 0.62 
(0.252) 
0.75*** 
(0.151) 
-0.05 
(0.158) 
-0.37 
(0.419) 
Internal political 
efficacy 
0.22 
(0.181) 
-0.03 
(0.093) 
-0.04 
(0.096) 
-0.42 
(0.288) 
External political 
efficacy 
0.08 
(0.169) 
0.13 
(0.086) 
0.16* 
(0.089) 
-0.65** 
(0.297) 
Political interest 0.12** 
(0.167) 
0.70*** 
(0.103) 
1.03*** 
(0.121) 
1.20*** 
(0.371) 
Constant -1.67 
(1.280) 
2.72 
(0.782) 
2.70 
(0.851) 
2.71 
(2.524) 
No. of observations 642 651 643 644 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*p<0.10. **p<.05. ***p<.01. 
 
 
 
 
